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Abstract
Traditionally, the study of on-line dynamic pricing and
bundling strategies for information goods is motivated by
the value-extracting or prot-generating potential of these
strategies. In this paper we discuss the relatively overlooked
potential of these strategies to on-line learn more about
customers’ preferences. Based on this enhanced customer
knowledge an information broker can by tailoring the bro-
kerage services more to the demand of the various customer
groups persuade customers to engage in repeated trans-
actions (i.e., generate customer lock-in). To illustrate the
discussion, we show by means of a basic consumer model
how, with the use of on-line dynamic bundling and pricing
algorithms, customer lock-in can occur. The lock-in occurs
because the algorithms can both nd appropriate prices and
(from the customers’ perspective) the most interesting bun-
dles. In the conducted computer experiments we use an ad-
vanced genetic algorithm with a niching method to learn the
most interesting bundles efciently and effectively.
1 Introduction
An information broker gathers/buys information from
various sources and sells it to his customers. Traditionally,
due to savings in production and transaction costs the infor-
mation is bundled and sold via subscriptions. Examples of
this practice are newspapers, scientific journals, and sub-
scriptions services such as Reuters’ Stockmaster service.
The coming of the Internet Economy changed the neces-
sity of bundling. Due to the digitization of information
goods— pushed by the existence of the Internet Economy—
the costs of producing and selling an additional information
good has become virtually zero. Consequently, it is cur-
rently economically feasible to deliver, for example, indi-
vidual news items or individual stock quotes to consumers
and have them pay per item. On the other hand, condi-
tional on consumers’ preferences, bundling various infor-
mation goods might still be useful because it can facilitate
the extraction of consumers’ valuation (cf. [2]).
In this changed environment, an information broker has
to reconsider his business strategy. More specifically, he has
to reconsider the way he bundles and positions his informa-
tion goods. As a consequence of the very low marginal costs
various different selling strategies can be profitable. Selling,
for example, only individual items, larger bundles, or a few
smaller bundles aimed at particular market niches can all be
profitable strategies. What the best strategy is depends on
consumers’ actual preferences.
Current developments in the machine learning commu-
nity provide an extra incentive for an information broker to
reconsider his business strategy. Typically, a seller of in-
formation goods does not have complete information about
consumers’ preferences. By employing machine learning
techniques, a seller can learn more about his customers; it
is even possible to apply some of these techniques on-line,
i.e., the obtained knowledge is directly and automatically
put to use. Two important application areas for these on-line
techniques are (on-line) dynamic bundling and/or pricing of
(information) goods and (automatic) recommender systems.
In this paper the focus lies on the economic importance of
these on-line learning techniques for information brokerage.
We make the observation that (automatic) recommender
systems can persuade customers to engage in repeated
transaction. That is, they especially enhance the value-
creating potential of an information broker through cus-
tomer lock-in. Within a competitive setting this is an im-
portant virtue because it reduces the competition with ri-
val firms. On the other hand, traditionally the study of on-
line dynamic pricing and/or bundling focuses on enhanc-
ing, what we call, the value-extracting (or profit-generating)
capacity of an information broker. Within a competitive
setting the important drawback of focusing on the value-
extracting aspects of these techniques is that they can in-
crease the competition with rival firms. The idea of this
paper is to focus on the value-creating potential of on-line
dynamic pricing and/or bundling techniques, especially on
their potential to create customer lock-in.
Properly working on-line dynamic pricing/bundling al-
gorithms require that, at least implicitly, more is learned
about customers’ preferences. The idea is that it can be ben-
eficial to make this knowledge explicit.
One possibility of generating customer lock-in (partly)
through the use of dynamic pricing/bundling algorithm is
by integrating these algorithms into an automatic recom-
mender system. In this paper, we present a framework
for such an integrated recommender system. Additionally,
we conduct computer experiments to illustrate how, by us-
ing on-line dynamic pricing and bundling algorithms, cus-
tomers’ preferences can explicitly be learned. The exper-
iments also show how this enhanced customer knowledge
leads to lock-in. In the conducted computer experiments we
use an advanced genetic algorithm with a niching method to
learn (from the customers’ perspective) the most interesting
bundles efficiently and effectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss the value-extracting potential of on-
line dynamic pricing and bundling. In Section 3, we use
the framework of [1] to analyze the value creating poten-
tial of (automatic) recommender systems for information
brokerage. In Section 4, we discuss integrating dynamic
bundling/pricing into recommender systems that recom-
mend based on sales statistics. In Section 5 we show how,
by using an on-line bundling algorithm, customer knowl-
edge can be enhanced. Conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 On-line Bundling & Pricing
Bundling is the practice of combining two or more items
together and selling them as one product. From a cost per-
spective, it has become economically feasible for an infor-
mation broker to offer a large variety of different bundles
for sale (targeted at various consumer groups).
Typically a seller of information goods has (very) limited
information about the distribution underlying customers’
valuation. Therefore (optimal) bundling of information
goods, generally, requires on-line learning of the appropri-
ate bundle-price combination. In [6] they reduce the com-
plexity of this on-line learning problem somewhat by sim-
plify the problem to essentially a dynamic pricing prob-
lem of finding the optimal prices for a particular pricing
scheme. (Note that, unlike [6], Section 5 introduces an ex-
plicit bundling and pricing framework.)
This bundling approach of [6]— and dynamic pricing
in general— entails the on-line automation of the process
of refining via trial and error the used pricing schemes.
The use of on-line learning algorithms has the advantage of
making frequent adjustments of the prices (and/or bundle
content) possible at little additional costs. Consequently,
past experience is incorporated into the price more fre-
quently. Hence, more exploitation is possible. To summa-
rize: this kind of on-line dynamic pricing and bundling en-
hance the value-extracting or profit-generating capacity of
an information broker.
Dynamic pricing (and/or bundling) may in particular be
important in an environment with relatively frequent and
unpredictable demand shocks. Additionally, in a setting of
imperfect competition, the need to apply dynamic pricing
may simple arise because the competition utilizes dynamic
pricing algorithms. The use of dynamic pricing algorithms
can increase the competition between sellers of information
goods [5]. Whether fierce competition actually occurs de-
pends, among other things, on the on-line learning algo-
rithms used [4].
3 Value Creation
3.1 Four Value Drivers
Partly due to the developments in the research on on-line
dynamic pricing and bundling it is very tempting to predict
the coming of an economists’ utopia of frictionless elec-
tronic trade, i.e., low search costs, strong price competition,
low margins, and low deadweight loss.
Clearly, a frictionless market is no utopia for firms. They
can bring friction back to the market place by competing on
more than just price characteristics. More specifically, firms
should focus on all aspects of the value-creating potential of
electronic business.
In [1] they analyze the value drivers in electronic busi-
ness. The four key value drivers they determine are: (trans-
action) efficiency, complementarities, lock-in and novelty.
• Transaction efficiency increases when the costs per
transaction decrease (“cost” is defined broadly). E.g.,
low search costs on the internet make it relatively easy
for buyers to compare various sellers.
• Goods are complementary whenever bundling them to-
gether generates more value than the total value of hav-
ing each of the goods separately.
• Lock-in refers to the ability to persuade customers to
engage in repeated transactions. The two main compo-
nents of lock-in are switching costs and positive net-
work externalities. On-line vendors can, for instance,
introduce switching costs by customizing their web
site. Network externalities occur in the context of elec-
tronic business when the value created for customers
increases with the size of the customer base (i.e., the
number of customers increases).
• Novelty involves the introduction of new products,
processes, or services on the internet.
The first three value drivers provide a good framework for
analyzing how an information broker can generate value.
Clearly, novelty is also important, but too case specific for
the purpose of this paper.
Traditionally, the study of on-line dynamic pricing and
bundling strategies for information goods is motivated by
the value-extracting or profit-generating potential of these
strategies (see Section 2). The kind of dynamic pricing and
bundling discussed in Section 2 may, however, also result in
value creation through (transaction) efficiency and comple-
mentarities. For information brokerage, another more obvi-
ous way of creating value is to recommend information to
customers. In Sections 4 and Section 5, we will show how
dynamic pricing and bundling of information may result in
value creation through customer lock-in. We will, however,
first briefly discuss the recommendation of information and
how that can result in value creation.
Recommending information to customers could eventu-
ally reduce their search costs for obtaining the desired infor-
mation. These search costs can be significant if, for exam-
ple, the “market value” of the information is low, the in-
formation is hard to categorize in advance, and/or at the
same time a lot of seemingly similar information is being
offered for sale. We will focus on (automatic) recommender
systems which are machine learning systems specialized to
recommend products in (electronic) commerce applications
(cf. [11]). For an information broker, in particular, auto-
matic recommender systems are interesting. (Henceforth
we will drop the adjective automatic.) They allow for a high
level of personalized recommendation at little cost relative
to the value of the offered information goods. In the next
subsection we will discuss recommender systems and how
they can result in value creation, especially customer lock-
in.
3.2 Recommender Systems
The heart of an information brokerage recommender sys-
tem should be an information filtering system. An infor-
mation filtering system divides a large-volume data stream
into substreams. We can roughly distinguish between
three types of information brokerage (recommender) sys-
tems.(Henceforth we will drop the adjective recommender.)
1. Collective system. The system keeps track of so called
stereotypes. It composes and updates the stereotypes
based on anonymous data, i.e., data from which it is not
possible to derive individual user history (e.g., aggre-
gate sales statistics). A stereotype roughly coincides
with the behavior and preferences of certain groups of
customers. The system uses the developed stereotypes
as a basis for its recommendations.
2. The personalized system. The system keeps track of
(individual) user profiles. It composes and updates a
profile based on the past behavior (and provided feed-
back) of the user.
3. The hybrid system. This system combines (1) and (2).
The method of collaborative (or social) filtering under-
lies the hybrid system. It develops and keeps track of
both individual user profiles and stereotypes.
By reducing the search cost of customers, all of the
above three types of information brokerage systems create
value via the value driver (transaction) efficiency. Addi-
tionally, all three generate value through customer lock-in.
(They, however, differ in the way they create customer lock-
in.)
From the consumers perspective the hybrid system has
the important drawback that it invades customers’ privacy.
Moreover it uses this private information to advice other
customers. In the extreme case, the system could implicitly
use a particular customer’s expertise of filtering out the right
information to advice others. Consider, for instance, the
case of an information broker of financial news. A partic-
ular customer of such a brokerage system, e.g. an investor,
may regard information on the type of news he consults pro-
prietary. Most likely he will not be willing to share this with
others.
The personalized system also has possible infringement
of customers’ privacy as an important drawback. It does,
however, not use this private information to advice others.
The main advantage of the collective system is that (since it
only uses anonymous data) it does not invade customers’
privacy at all, nor can it potentially do so. A collective
system thus actually tries to recommend based on domain
specific “non-private” knowledge. In this paper we further
focus on such systems, and in particular the use of sales data
as the domain specific knowledge. We will call the collec-
tive system henceforth the market oriented system.
4 Bundling & Recommending
Thus far we have treated recommending and the dynamic
bundling/pricing of goods as two separate approaches. In
this section we discuss recommendation based on sales
statistics. Especially for this type of recommender systems,
integrating the dynamic bundling/pricing of goods into (ac-
tive and automatic) recommendation can be beneficial.
4.1 Recommendation, Bundling, & Pricing
Simply put, the idea of recommendation based on sales
statistics is that customers’ buying behavior could reveal
their preferences. A great advantage of recommendation
based on sales statistics is that it does not require customers
to instruct the system about their preferences which is rather
time consuming for the customers and costly in terms of
(human) resources. Moreover, what customers say about
their preferences might not coincide with their actual behav-
ior. Furthermore sales statistics can be derived from anony-
mous data; hence such a system does not necessarily require
the infringement of customers’ privacy.
For a seller of information goods it may be ad-
vantageous to integrate the dynamic bundling/pricing of
goods into recommendation. Using on-line dynamic pric-
ing/bundling techniques has— unlike more traditional data-
mining techniques— the advantages that knowledge about
customers is obtained interactively. The information broker
can thus explicitly offer various bundles for sale and fre-
quently experiment with the composition and price of these
bundles. Consequently, the seller can improve the quality
of the recommendations.
An additional advantage is that by buying a bundle which
captures some of a customer’s preferences the customer is
saved the trouble of searching and paying for all the individ-
ual items that constitute the bundle. Thus, whenever the of-
fered bundles closely match various customers’ categories
they could reduce the search and transaction costs for cus-
tomers belonging to these categories.
4.2 An Integrated Recommender System
We present a framework for an integrated recommender
system. The idea is to identify a collection of (sub)bundles
with customer stereotypes. This collection of (sub)bundles
represent the currently conjectured building blocks for the
actual product bundles. The actual bundles offered are ob-
tained by combining one or more customer stereotypes (or
(sub)bundles). The sales data generated by the online dy-
namic pricing/bundling algorithms are used, on the one
hand, to update the bundles and possibly the stereotypes.
Customer feedback on recommended items is used, on the
other hand, to update the stereotypes and possibly the bun-
dles. In figure 1 we draw the basic flowchart of the integrate
recommender system.
Initiating such an integrated recommender system can
be particular difficult because there are so many bundling
options. Moreover, very little is known about the various
consumers’ stereotypes. A reasonable approach could be
to start off with a limited number of stereotypes, which—
based on the already available knowledge of consumers’
preferences— are expected to result in a reasonably prof-
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Figure 1. A integrated recommender system.
itable partition of the potential customers. The offered bun-
dles could at least initially coincide with these stereotypes.
A richer and more diverse collection of customer stereo-
types can then gradually be developed based on the repeated
sales statistics. We will present an explicit approach in Sec-
tion 5.
5 Bundling Scheme & Experiments
In this Section, the focus lies on the dynamic bundling
problem (as oppose to the dynamic pricing problem). Typ-
ically this problem is solved as a dynamic pricing problem
(see Section 2). We, instead, explicitly address the problem
of finding dynamically the appropriate bundle contents.
The conducted computer experiments follow the sugges-
tion made in Section 4.2 to identify customer stereotypes
with bundles. We use an advanced genetic algorithm (GA)
with a niching method to on-line search for the bundles
that coincide with the preferences of the various customer
groups. As a feedback for costumers’ preferences we use
aggregate sales date, only. Thus, we learn more about cus-
tomers’ preference without any infringement of customers’
privacy.
The experiments show how— through the use of on-
line dynamic bundling— an information broker can develop
more accurate customer stereotypes. Additionally, they
show how exploitation of these more accurate stereotypes
leads to customer lock-in given a small customer bias to-
wards bundles. Another (not explicitly demonstrated) way
to exploit these more accurate stereotypes is to have the in-
tegrated recommender system, outlined in Section 4.2, use
these updated customer stereotypes to make more accurate
recommendations. Thus, the experiments illustrate how the
use of on-line dynamic bundling algorithms can both di-
rectly and indirectly increase the value-creating potential of
an information broker.
We choose a very common but basic consumer model
to simulate the customers. A limitation of this basic con-
sumer model is that whenever bundles are not explicitly
being offered aggregate sales data will reveal very little
about consumer preferences. By explicitly offering bun-
dles for sale, the seller generates sales data on consumer
demand for various groups of goods. From these data he
can learn more about the preferences of the various cus-
tomer groups. Hence, the basic consumer model does illus-
trate how, due to the interactive characteristics of the on-line
dynamic bundling process, it is possible to manipulate the
informativeness of the generated sales data. This interactive
aspect of the learning process stands in stark contrast with
traditional data-mining techniques.
5.1 Setup Market Simulation
In the conducted experiments we consider two types of
markets: a monopolistic market (with 1 information bro-
ker); and a duopolistic market (with 2 information brokers).
The monopolist offers a set of n individual goods and m
bundles for sale in every trading period. The bundles are
constructed from the set of all n individual goods. In the
duopolistic market both brokers offer an identical set of n
individual goods for sale in every trading period. One bro-
ker also offers m bundles for sale. To reduce consumers’
problem of finding the desired information goods m is sig-
nificantly smaller than 2n (all possible bundles).
Although the brokers in the duopolistic market sell
identical (individual) goods they, nevertheless, enjoy some
monopoly power because consumers incur a search cost
whenever they visit the other broker to compare prices. It
goes beyond the scope of the paper to introduce an elaborate
search model to formalize these search costs. For the pur-
pose of the paper it suffices to simply introduce a tendency
towards customer lock-in due to search costs. We obtain
this tendency by assuming that there is no comparison be-
tween brokers within trading periods. There is, however,
cross-period comparison.
At the beginning of every trading period a consumer
chooses an information broker and sticks to that choice
throughout the trading period. In most cases, the consumer
chooses to visit the information broker with the highest ex-
pected utility. With a small probability of ² the customer
deviates from this strategy. The utility of previous visits are
used to compute the expected utility. More precisely, a con-
sumer uses Q-learning to update the expected utilities and
the ²-greedy policy rule to determine the next choice (cf.
[12]).
We use a slightly modified version of the basic consumer
models introduced by [3] to describe consumers’ valuation
for the various goods. The model consists of two (main)
parameters: w, which indicates a consumer’s value for its
most preferred good and k, which (as long as the valua-
tion is positive) determines, in combination with n, the dif-
ference between the ith and (i + 1)th preferred good. For
consumer j, the valuation vj(i) of the ith preferred good is
determined by the following function:
vj(i) =
{
wj(1−
i−1
kjn
) if i ≤ li + 1
0 if i > li + 1
(1)
with li ≤ kjn; li denotes the number of goods with a
nonzero value. In order to create various relatively ho-
mogenous consumer groups wj is relatively similar within a
consumer group and relatively different between consumer
groups. (See Figure 2 for an illustration of the consumer
model.)
We assume that consumers optimize a linear utility func-
tion without any budget constraints. Let b denote the col-
lection of individual goods and bundles that are being of-
fered (by the information broker that is currently visited)
and suppose a consumer purchases the collection b′ out of
b (b′ ⊆ b). Moreover, let G(b′) denote the collection of
individual goods that is associated with the purchase of b′
(G(b′) ≡ ∪x∈b′x). Then utility maximizing by the jth con-
sumer implies maxb′⊆b Uj(b′) with
Uj(b
′) =
∑
i∈G(b′)
vj(i)− (p(b
′) + cs · |b
′|). (2)
The three additive parts of the utility function are from left
to right: the value consumer j attaches to consuming the
goods in G(b′); the cost of purchasing the bundles and in-
dividual goods in b′; and the number of transactions (|b′|)
times the search cost per transaction (cs). The third part of
the utility function introduces a consumer bias towards bun-
dles (i.e., fewer transactions). The underlying idea is that
it— is more convenient— requires less (search) efforts to
obtain the desired goods through fewer transactions. (Note
that whenever cs is not zero it should be a relatively small
positive number.)
5.2 Bundling Approach
Ideally, the sales of a particular bundle should imply that
a utility maximizing customer is actually interested in all
the goods which make up the bundle. To warrant such a
conclusion we let the bundle price be a direct function of the
price a consumer pays whenever all the goods are bought
individually.
Suppose bi is the collection of elements that define the
ith bundle, p(bi) denotes the price of the ith bundle, p(j)
the (individual) price of the jth good, and G(b) denotes the
collections of all goods that are part of at least one of the m
bundles currently being offered for sale by the information
broker (i.e., G(b) = ∪x∈bx and b = {b1, . . . , bm}). We can
then define the ith bundle price as follows:
p(bi) =
∑
j∈bi
p(j)− αi ·min({p(j) : j ∈ G(b)}) (3)
with 0 < αi < 1; αi is a function of the bundle size |bi|
(the bigger |bi|, the bigger αi). Note that αi represents the
bundle reduction. In the experiments it is set very close to
0 such that offering bundles does not significantly influence
total profit.
Equation (3) stands for a whole family of bundle-price
functions. The distinguishing property of this family is that
the sales of a particular bundle means that a utility maximiz-
ing customer is interested in all the individual goods that
make up the bundle and no bigger sized bundle for which
this property holds is being offered. For the experimental
results on learning customer preferences (see Section 5.4)
it only matters that the used pricing scheme belongs to this
family of bundle-price functions.
Since bundle prices are a direct function of the individual
good prices, we can now use two learning algorithms: one
to adjust the individual good prices (and consequently the
bundle prices) and another to adjust the bundle definitions.
The task of the pricing algorithm is to adjust the prices with
the objective of maximizing total revenue. The bundling al-
gorithm adjusts the bundle definitions with the objective of
maximizing the revenue generated by the individual bun-
dles. Due to the way bundle prices are constructed this
means that the algorithm searches for the bundles that coin-
cide with the preferences of the various customer groups.
5.3 The On-Line Learning Algorithms
The focus in the experiments lies on on-line discover-
ing the best bundle definitions. The purpose of the dynamic
pricing algorithm is mainly to mimic the more realistic sit-
uation where the bundling algorithm works in conjunction
with an algorithm that on-line adjusts the individual good
prices (and consequently the bundle prices). We therefore
choose a relatively standard and well documented dynamic
pricing algorithm; consequently, it also not necessary to dis-
cuss the pricing algorithm in great detail.
Like [6] we use the Amoeba algorithm as the on-line
dynamic pricing algorithm. Amoeba is a hill-climbing al-
gorithm. Given n individual goods the Amoeba algorithm
stores n + 1 price vectors. Every price vector represents a
possible pricing scheme for the n goods. The geometrical
representation of these price vectors is a simplex. By ma-
nipulating the shape of the simplex the algorithm searches
for the pricing scheme which results in the highest profit.
For further details on the Amoeba algorithm (or simplex
method) cf. [9].
We use an advanced genetic algorithm (GA) with a nich-
ing method to on-line adjust the bundle definitions. The
problem of finding the best bundle definitions is a combina-
torical optimizing problem of finding multiple optima in a
search space. A GA combined with a niching method can
relatively quickly find multiple optima, which is essentially
our problem. Two elegant aspects of this technique are that
it does not require explicit information about the number
of optima in the search space, and that significantly lower
optima can also be detected.
We follow the recommendations of [10] and [8] by using
a clearing procedure as the niching method, combined with
stochastic uniform sampling, and an elitist strategy. (See
[8] for a discussion of the clearing procedure and [7] for a
discussion of stochastic uniform sampling and elitist strate-
gies.) The clearing procedure is called after evaluating the
fitness of individuals and before applying the selection op-
erator. Given a list of all individuals in the population sorted
in decreasing order according to the fitness, the procedure
works roughly as follows (cf. [8]):
1. Pick from the remaining individuals the next individ-
ual. This individual dominates the current niche.
2. The remaining individuals of the current niche are all
individuals within the “clearing radius” σ of the dom-
inant individual. The fitness of all except the first γ
individuals in the current niche is reset to zero.
3. All individuals of the current niche are removed from
the list.
4. Go to line 1.
The clearing method uses a dissimilarity measure (in our
case the normalized Hamming distance) to determine if two
individuals belong to the same subpopulation. Individuals
belong to the same niche if the clearing radius is less than
σ. The capacity γ of a niche specifies the maximum number
of elements that this niche can except. Clearing preserves
the fitness of the γ best individuals of a subpopulation and
resets the fitness of the others that belong to the same sub-
population.
In each generation of the GA, the dominant individual of
each niche competes with the corresponding one of the pre-
vious generation. The winners of the resulting tournaments
are directly place in the new population. Stochastic uniform
sampling is used to determine the remaining individuals in
the new population.
Given n goods an individual has a chromosome of length
n. The definition of one bundle is encoded onto one chro-
mosome, where a bit value of 1 (0) at the ith position means
that the ith good is (not) part of the bundle. The fitness of
an individual is determined by the revenue of the bundle it
represents.
By construction of the bundle price a consumer does not
want a bundle if it already contains one good she is not in-
terested in (see Section 5.2). Consequently, an almost but
not completely “correct” bundle might result in a zero rev-
enue. To prevent that certain almost correct bundles in the
GA die out too soon, sigma scaling is used to recompute the
“raw” fitness (cf. [7]).
5.4 Results Experiments
The GA has a population of 90 individuals that evolve
for at most 100 generations. The initial population consti-
tutes a random draw from all individuals that define bundles
of 2 goods. The GA uses two point crossover. The muta-
tion and crossover probability are 0.02 and 0.6, respectively.
Throughout the conducted experiments n, the number of in-
dividual goods, is set to 20 and m, the number of offered
bundles, is at most 5.
For the consumer model (discussed in Section 5.1) We
consider 4 consumer groups each interested in a different
group of products. The number of customers per group and
the value of the most preferred goods are randomly drawn
from uniform distributions. There are 245, 102, 235 and
160 consumers in group 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In order
to test the robustness of the bundling scheme we consider 8
different cases for the customer groups. Case 1 is the case
where all 4 customer groups are interested in 5 different
goods (see figure 2).
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Figure 2. Average values of groups for case 1
We generate the other cases by slightly permutating the
ordering of the ith preferred good, and by adjusting l the
number of nonzero valued goods and k the speed at which
the ith preferred good becomes 0 (see Section 5.1) such that
the number of goods all customer groups are interested in
increases. We consider the cases where the customer groups
have a common interest in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12 and 16 out of
the 20 goods (see table 1). (To put it differently, we consider
the cases where the hamming distance between the various
customer groups ranges from 10 to 2.)
Case Inta
1 ∅
2 {6}
3 {6, 11}
4 {6, 11, 16}
5 {1, 6, 11, 16}
6 {1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17}
7 {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18}
8 {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19}
a Goods all customer groups are interested in.
Table 1. Shared interest
We put an upper and lower bound on the individual good
prices determined by the Amoeba algorithm. These bounds
are chosen so that the goods demanded by the four cus-
tomer groups remain unchanged. Consequently, we can
judge how well the GA performs given stable niches but
changing prices. The bounds are chosen so that they max-
imize the interval in which a price can move. Due to the
price changes it becomes more difficult for the GA to com-
pare the fitness of two bundles traded in different periods
which belong to the same generation. To reduce the nega-
tive effects of these asynchronous price changes somewhat,
the fitness of an individual is measured as a percentage of
the total profit in that period.
We conducted two series of experiments: the first se-
ries apply to the monopolistic market and the second to the
duopolistic market. In the first series of experiments there
is only one information broker (the monopolist) who uses
the GA to find the various customer groups. In the other
series of experiments there is also another information bro-
ker who only offers the 20 individual goods for sale. Table
2 shows the performance of the GA for the first series of
experiments. It shows the average result of 25 conducted
experiments for the 8 cases.
Case σ NFa BFb Genc Pd FEe
1 0.15 3.68 98.2 72 1099 5376
2 0.15 3.68 98.6 70 1112 5420
3 0.15 3.68 98.6 70 1159 5632
4 0.15 3.84 98.9 66 1115 5407
5 0.15 3.88 99.4 58 1001 4849
6 0.10 3.60 98.2 74 1386 6706
7 0.10 3.68 99.4 66 1488 7246
8 0.10 2.76 92.0 82 2026 10003
a Average number of niches found out of 4.
b Average % of goods found in niches.
c Average number of generation to find niches.
d Average number of trading periods to find niches.
e Average number of fitness evaluations.
Table 2. Results monopolistic market
For most cases the clearing radius (σ) is set to 0.15,
which means that individuals belong to the same niche as a
dominant individual if their Hamming distance is 2 or less.
Because the problem changes so dramatically from case 1
to case 8 it is necessary for a good performance of the GA to
set σ to 0.10 for some cases (individuals belong to the same
niche as a dominant individual if their Hamming distance is
1 or less). Throughout the experiments γ, (which denoted
the number of individuals in a niche that are not reset) is set
to 4. The performance of the GA for the first seven cases
is very good. The fact that customer groups have common
interest does not necessarily complicate the task of the GA.
The reason is that there are more useful building blocks than
whenever the customer groups are completely disjunct. For
the last case the performance of the GA drops (but remains
good) because the difference between the various customer
groups becomes very small.
In the second series of experiments we repeat the exper-
iments of the first series only now with an additional infor-
mation broker. The performance of the GA drops from find-
ing around 98% of all goods in the niches to finding around
94% of the goods. Table 3 shows the results with a search
costs (cs) of 2 (see Eq. (2)) and ²— the probability of devi-
ating from visiting the “best” store— is set to 0.05 (see Sec-
tion (5.1)). The GA does find most niches. However, every
Case σ NFa BFb Pc FEd MSe
1 0.15 3.44 95.8 1193 5814 40
2 0.15 3.00 91.1 1523 7427 28
3 0.15 3.00 94.0 1647 8006 52
4 0.15 3.28 95.9 1607 7799 68
5 0.15 3.12 96.3 1579 7650 68
6 0.10 2.76 94.1 1897 9205 76
7 0.10 2.76 95.9 2059 10079 84
8 0.10 2.72 90.6 2094 10310 96
a Average number of niches found out of 4.
b Average % of goods found in niches.
c Average number of trading periods to find niches.
d Average number of fitness evaluations.
e Average number of times market share >= 60%.
Table 3. Results duopolistic market
now and then all or almost all customers interested in a par-
ticular niche end up choosing the competitor. Consequently,
it becomes difficult for the GA to maintain the optimal solu-
tion generation after generation. Although the GA does not
generally preserve knowledge of all niches throughout the
simulation, the broker with the bundling scheme does obtain
a market share of 60% or more in most of the experiments
from case 3 up until including case 8 (see last column table
3). Thus, customer lock-in does not require perfect perfor-
mance of the GA. The reason why customer lock-in occurs
in especially the latter cases is that the absolute search cost
(due to the fact that customers are interested in more goods)
increases. (The bundle reduction consumers get by buying
bundles does not contribute to customer lock-in in these ex-
periments due to the relatively insignificant absolute value
of the reduction.)
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we argue that it can be advantageous to in-
tegrate on-line dynamic pricing and/or bundling techniques
into a recommender system; particularly, if such a system
recommends based on (non-personal) sales statistics. We
present the framework of such an integrated recommender
system. In addition we presented on-line learning tech-
niques by which the interest of the various customer groups
can be learned effectively and efficiently based on the sales
data. We explicitly show through computer experiments
how on-line dynamic bundling techniques can facilitate the
(on-line) development of more accurate customer stereo-
types. Additionally, the experiments show how exploitation
of these more accurate stereotypes leads to customer lock-in
given a small bias towards bundles. Based on these more ac-
curate stereotypes the integrated recommender system can
also reduce customers’ search costs by making more ac-
curate recommendation and consequently create customer
lock-in.
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